Free AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4671 Spring 2024

Free AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4671 Spring 2024

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Course: Development Economics-I (4671)
Semester: Spring, 2024
Level: MSc Economics
Assignment No:1


Q.1    Discuss the international structuralism model as a tool for offsetting the institutional and structural economic rigidities in developing countries.


The concept of economic structure refers to the composition of productive activities associated with some influences, such as: the specialization pattern in international trade; the technological capacities of the economy, including the educational level of the labour force; the property structure of the production factors; the nature and development basis of institutions; the level of development and restrictions under which certain markets operate (the lack of certain segments of the financial market or the existence of a large unemployment rate, for instance); among others (Ocampo, Rada & Taylor, 2009).

The contribution of this paper lays in synthetizing the aforementioned tradition, with emphasis on the structuralist method. This allows to contribute for the way of how certain categories (i.e.,, structures) are important for the economic development of periphery countries, as well as for the determination of how these were first developed and later incorporated into what has been defined as structuralist macroeconomics. Indeed, this paper shows the evolution of this approach and the way in which it transformed itself, in order to explain the growth process of developing countries under center-periphery relationship. Clearly, structuralist thought is much more complex than how it is portrayed and revisited in this work, given its diversity of subjects and associated unfoldings. Therefore, this paper focus on the methodological aspects of such tradition as well as on the main elements composing structuralist macroeconomics. Furthermore, its analytical focus lies in the economic structuralism associated with the thought of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, also known for its Latin American acronym CEPAL), not having as an objective the making of a detailed analysis of the ‘original’ structuralism – although the validity of this otherwise potential objective is duly recognized.

It is noteworthy that this paper strives to follow a chronological order, i.e.,, it presents the developments in structuralist macroeconomics throughout the 1970s and 1980s as an unfolding of the Latin American structuralist approach. It is possible that some authors will disagree with this interpretation, in spite of the fact there are enough elements to allow for the establishment of such association1. Moreover, it should be observed that ECLAC theory, focused in the structural problems of developing economies has a long-term concern. This implies that the macroeconomic aspects are harder to study specifically or to identify at first, even if these elements become clearer in further stages.

In order to fulfil its aims, this paper is structured in three separate sections, in addition to this introduction and a final remarks section at the end. The first of these, handles the definition of the structuralist tradition, its origins and foundations. The third section presents structuralist macroeconomics, while fourth section discusses neo-structuralism. Finally, we present concluding remarks.

structuralism distances itself from methodological individualism. According to the latter, the analysis of human action may be carried out from the perspective of individual agents. As such, it states that all social phenomena are better explained by the properties of the individuals comprised within the phenomena. Or even, in other words, that every explanation that involves sociological concepts on a macro level should, at first, be reduced to explanations on a micro level of the individuals and their properties. On the other hand, structuralism largely aligns with methodological holism, to which: (a) totality, as such, can be considered more than simply its parts, or even, more than the sum of its parts (i.e.,, the whole surpasses the sum of the parts); and (b) totality is historically, logically, cognitively and normatively more important (i.e.,, hierarchically superior) than the individuals it contains. Furthermore, it should be taken into consideration that, in its more elaborated versions, structuralism admits the individual behaviour as a product of social relations. This means that structural analysis emphasizes internal relations (i.e.,, interdependency), thus incorporating systemic properties that cannot be reduced to their constitutive parts. They are properties of the whole, which the parts do not have on their own, and that emerge from the ‘organizational relations’ among them. According to (Jackson 2003, pp. 727-728):

Structural theory can sometimes turn into holism and give the whole precedence over the parts, yet the original aim of structural ideas – as against holistic ones – was to ensure that the whole could always be transformed, or else the whole-part relationship would be redundant. A structural method, if handled properly, should never congeal into structural wholes that overshadow their component parts.

Street and James (1982) admit that economic structuralism represents a holistic approach that comprises two basic concepts: one related to the economic system and the other to human nature. The first identifies the economic system as a non- equilibrium and evolutionary process instead of an equilibrating mechanism for stable economic relations centred in market activities2, while the second conceives human behaviour as characterized by customary patterns resulting from cultural conditioning. It is thus distinct from the conventional (or orthodox) economic point of view, which conceives human behaviour as essentially dedicated to utilitarian motivation and to monetary calculus in a static market system. On the other hand, Di Filippo (2009) understands that structuralism involves four characteristics: a systemic reading of society, a global view, a historic-structural perspective, and the multidimensionality of approaches.

According to structuralist perspective, orthodox economic theory, in order to accredit itself as a positive science of market laws, needs to be abstracted from the specificities of productive structures, institutions, and the other sociological factors integrating the concrete reality of national economic systems. In the words of (Taylor 1983, p. 3), “non economic, or even non maximized, forces affecting actions are ruled out of discussion”. The abstraction of these characteristics means, in the context of some macroeconomic problems, not only the propensity to confuse the fundamental causes and the sanctioning factors of these problems, but also their main weakness as guidelines to economic policy.

Therefore, the critical posture of the structuralist approach towards orthodox economic thought is underlined. Such a posture defends an alternative form of economic investigation, such as in the Latin American structuralist comprehension of development and underdevelopment, which understands these phenomena as mutually constructive processes within an economically integrated world. In other words, it emphasizes the understanding of the world economy as a unified system with the economic dynamics of its constituting parts, centre and periphery, which should be defined in terms of their relations. This analysis is different from those carried out by orthodox economics, which considers relatively independent units.


In economic terms, structuralism is generally associated with ECLAC, whose works gave origin to this school of thought in the late 1950s. According to Arndt (1985), the term originally appeared as a reference to an explanation of the inflationary process in Latin America. Nevertheless, it is agreed that structuralist thought in its initial form was created by the economist Raúl Prebisch. In his 1949 manifesto, Prebisch introduced the notion of an international structure divided between an industrial hegemonic centre and an agrarian dependent periphery, both of which determine the existence of an original and unequal development process. According to Bielschowsky (1998), this approach has four analytical components: (i) an historical approach, based on the binary centre-periphery opposition; (ii) an international insertion analysis of Latin America; (iii) a study of the domestic determinants of growth and technological progress; and (iv) an evaluation of arguments favouring or against State intervention.

This emphasis on ‘structures’ becomes clear, after the works of Prebisch and Furtado, whether such structures are economic, political or social in nature. According to Sunkel (1970), “given the structure of the system, the way in which it works is determined, which in turn originates the results the system produces” (p. 526, free translation from Portuguese). As such, structuralist scholars become conceptually known and recognized by their diagnosis in which ‘structural deficiencies’, ‘bottlenecks’ or ‘inner dysfunctions’ are the factors responsible for the developmental divergences in Latin America. These ‘dysfunctions’ have two fundamental sources: (i) those of foreign origin, such as the adverse conditions of trade and the limited capacity to import; and (ii) those of domestic origin, such as accelerated population growth, premature urbanization and the expansion of service sectors, as well as the underdevelopment of agricultural production, the reduced dimensions of the domestic markets and the presence of inefficient tributary systems (Street, 1967, p. 55).

The identification of such factors in conjunction with the centre-periphery construct (and the other theses associated with it) has allowed for the development of formal theories with strict connection to economic policy recommendations, which led (Seers 1962, pp. 192-193) to state that:

The Latin American school of ‘structuralists’  must be the first indigenous school of economics in an underdeveloped area. Since economic growth is becoming increasingly fashionable as a subject, and since the weakness in commodity markets, the population boom, and rising economic ambitions appear chronic, the school could acquire in the 1960s an international interest comparable to that of Keynesian economics during the slump-ridden decade of the 1930s.

At this point, it is necessary to highlight two essential aspects. First, one should underline the methodological aspects of Latin American structuralism. In this case, two different interpretations can be identified: on the one hand, according to authors such as Gibson (2003) and Jamenson (1986), it would be possible to identify a considerably large part of the origins of economic structuralism, especially that which surfaced in the 1940s and 1950s, as a product or extension of preceding works in other, pre-existing fields of knowledge such as in Levi-Strauss (anthropology), Godelier (sociology), Piaget (psychology), Foucault (philosophy), among others. In this context, Love (2005) states that Latin American structuralism is ‘one’ among a ‘family’ of structuralisms (p. 101). Also, that some of the central elements of ECLAC thought could be found in preceding works, such as in the French ‘structuralist’ school (Blankenburg, Palma & Tregenna, 2008) or in the German historic economics school (Love, 2005), in the Marxist school (Sunkel, 1989; Lustig, 1988) or in the Keynesian, post-Keynesian and neoclassical traditions (Love, 1996; Lustig, 1988).

On the other hand, the most recognized and widespread interpretation (with which the authors of this paper identify), which is derived especially from the work of Celso Furtado, goes in the opposite direction in the sense of characterizing a ‘new structuralist school’. Firstly, because, in Furtado’s own words, Latin American structuralism has little to do with its French homonym:

What can be understood by ‘structuralist’ thought in economics has no direct relation with the French structuralist school, whose general orientation has been to privilege the synchrony axis in social analysis and to establish a ‘syntax’ of disparities in social organizations. Economic structuralism (a school of thought originated in the first half of the 1950s among Latin American economists) had as its main objective to put in evidence the importance of the ‘non-economic parameters’ of macroeconomic models. Since the behaviour of economic variables depends largely on these parameters and the nature of the latter can significantly modify itself in phases of social change or when the analytical time horizon is broadened, these parameters must be the object of thorough study. This observation is particularly pertinent in respect to socially and technologically heterogeneous economic systems, such as is the case of underdeveloped economies (Furtado, 2000, p. 95, free translation from Portuguese).

Since non-economic factors integrate the structural matrix of the model with which the economist works3, those who gave special emphasis to the study of such parameters were dubbed ‘structuralists’, or even, according to Fonseca (2009), “not only does ECLAC structuralism take as its own the ambition to embrace non-economic variables in its models and theories, but also makes it its exact reason for being, its brand or differential in comparison to other economic schools, as far as methodology is concerned” (p. 876, free translation from Portuguese).

Also, according to Bielschowsky (1998), in other social science disciplines such as linguistics and anthropology, from which ‘structuralism’ originate, the term typically corresponded to a synchronic or non-historical methodological instrument. On the other hand, in the economic analysis of structuralism, the focus is essentially oriented to the search for diachronic, historical and comparative relations in which special attention is dedicated to the behaviour of social agents and to the trajectory of institutions.

Secondly, Latin America structuralism was a phenomenon clearly belonging to economics. That means it pays tribute not to Lévi-Strauss, but mainly to Max Weber and François Perroux (Fonseca, 2009, p. 871). Furtado directly refers to Perroux in his writings by mentioning that the term ‘structure’ resembles the French author’s classic definition: “Proportions et relations qui caractérisent um ensemble économique localisé dans le temps et dans l’espace4 (Pour um approfondissement de la notion de strucure, 1939)” (Furtado, 2000, p. 94). Indeed, although it does not fully abandon this theoretical notion, it gains a different meaning upon incorporation into the structuralist speech by its conceptual recomposition and by the introduction of historical matters and regional specificities into the analysis (Mallorquín, 1999), not to mention the introduction of social matters5.

Beyond that, Furtado (2000) makes explicit what would be the genealogic elements of ‘structuralism’: on the one side is Marxism, from which he states he extracted the idea of ‘structures’. In other words, the structuralist analysis gives emphasis to ‘social structures’, which in turn describe the ‘behaviour of economic variables’. Therefore, in order to apply an economic analysis, it is necessary to follow (throughout time) the modifications of the structural matrixes (which accompany the social division of labour) in economic models.

On the other side, he states that economic models are constituted almost in the same way Weber crafts his ‘ideal types’:

From the point of view of their conception, the models with which the economist works present great similarity with the ‘ideal types’ introduced by Max Weber. In one case or another, these are representations (which the economist seeks to formalize) of simple or complex elements of social reality, in which all aspects of the represented elements are defined with accuracy, i.e.,, possessing precise logical significance. Thus, the ‘market’ with which the economist works in price theory is a set of elements abstracted from reality with the virtue of being intelligible in all its aspects. Albeit at this level of abstraction the market model may represent no real situation, even then its value as an analytical instrument is undeniable (Furtado, 2000, p. 94, free translation from Portuguese).

In the exposition of the construction of these macroeconomic models, important characteristics become evident. One of these refers to the link with historical reality, since the “effort to capture economic reality in the scope of a system is due to the work of long-time empiricists dedicated to drawing a map, as complete as possible, of the multiple social processes open to quantitative expression” (Furtado, 2000, p. 96, free translation from Portuguese, highlight added). In other words, historical and statistical studies are indispensable instruments for avoiding hurried theoretical generalizations lacking empirical substantiation.

The other characteristic, which recalls the Schumpeterian concept of ‘ vision’, refers to the proposition according to which every construct has, beforehand, a global idea of economic reality6. And since this global idea refers to an historical reality, the macroeconomic model must equally refer to this same historical reality. This means that structural changes and economic phenomena can have different meanings in different periods, so that any analysis is historically contingent7.

In summary, the explanatory role of macroeconomic models in the structuralist approach projects itself onto two levels: the first, in which abstract formulations predominate, requires the construction of simplified models or schemes of existing economic systems, based on the stable relations between quantifiable and relevant variables. The second, the historical level, covers the critical study, in confrontation with a given reality, of the basic categories defined in the abstract analysis. It is not enough to construct an abstract model and craft an explanation of its inner workings. Equally important is the verification of the explanatory efficacy of such a model in confrontation with a historical reality. Therefore, the fundamental methodological problem is to define up to what point it is possible to eliminate from an abstract model the simplifying suppositions, incompatible with the historical reality, without invalidating its explanatory efficacy (Furtado, 2000).

The second essential aspect to be highlighted refers to the delimitation of this thought. This illustrates the fact that there is no consensus within economic literature as to the concept of what would constitute the structuralist approach, or even who the main authors would be. According to Chenery (1975), many times this approach is identified by an initial set of structural hypotheses formed in the 1950s by authors such as Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurke, W. Arthur Lewis, Raúl Prebisch, Hans Singer and Gunnar Myrdal, having as its general view a critical position about the thesis of ‘free market’ efficiency and as its main arguments the presence of imbalances and the inflexibility in the response of prices to incentives. This view is shared by Arndt (1985) and defined by Love (1996) as a more general structuralism, identified as a ‘market failure doctrine’, which can be understood as an attempt to distinguish itself from both the neoclassical tradition and from neo-Marxism. According to (Chenery 1975, p. 313):

The structuralist concept of development as characterized by rigidities that limit economic adjustments requires an analytical framework in which external policy is more closely linked to domestic resource allocation than does the neoclassical view, which minimizes these restrictions.

On the other hand, many of the aforementioned authors are identified as ‘developmentalist’ (Bielschowsky, 2009) or ‘development pioneers’ (Sanchez-Ancochea, 2007). As demonstrated below, many theoretical insights are common to both authors, even if there are fundamental differences. This shows how the Latin American structuralism constitutes itself into a genuine approach, despite having received an important intellectual stimulus from other thinkers, not necessarily ‘structuralists’. According to (Seers 1962, pp. 193-194):

Visitors to ECLAC in recent years who have had some influence in the same direction though one would not necessarily call them ‘structuralists’, have included Thomas Balogh, Hollis Chenery, Nicholas Kaldor, Julio Olivera, Nancy Ruggles, Richard Ruggles, and Jan Tinbergen. I am very well aware that these lists of names could easily be twice or three times as long .

Adopting the classification proposed by Sanchez-Ancochea (2007), two structuralist approaches are identified which, despite having connections between them, are fundamentally different: the Anglo-Saxon approach and the Latin American approach, derived from ECLAC8. Anglo-Saxon structuralism is identified in theories based on the following key concepts: complementarity and poverty trap (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurke, 1953), linkages (Hirschman, 1958), and dualism (Lewis, 1954). This approach concentrates its interest on giving realistic explanations to the causes of underdevelopment. As such, focusing on the determinants of long-term expansion, it seeks to shed light upon the complex and dynamic character of structural change, showing that development involves transformations in demand structures and production capable of driving the country (or region) towards higher productivity trajectories.

The Latin American theory shares many theoretical concepts with the previous approach, including the perception of a tendency to concentrate resources, the insistence on the necessity for structural change in the periphery, and the rejection of comparative advantages theory. Notwithstanding, these two approaches are substantially different. In conclusive terms, the major divergences lie on the perception, on the side of Latin American structuralism, that countries do not follow a universal trajectory towards development, that relations between developed and developing countries are not always mutually beneficial, and that the historical particularities of different periods are important.

AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4671 Spring 2024

Q.2    Discuss the major economic and non-economic obstacles in the way of economic development in Pakistan.


Some of the main economic obstacles are given below:

1- Deficiency of Capital and Foreign Exchange

There is scarcity of capital and foreign exchange in Pakistan. Lack of capital and foreign exchange are a big hurdle in way of economic development. Per capita income is very low i.e., $ 1095. Low level of per capita income results in low saving and low investment. Domestic saving is just 9.9 % of GDP in Pakistan; it should be 25 % for rapid economic development. Foreign exchange reserves of Pakistan are just $ 15.0 billion.

2- Vicious Circle of Poverty

According to Ranger Nurkse, vicious circle of poverty is the greatest obstacle in way of economic development. In developing countries there is low income that leads to low saving and low investment. Low level of investment causes low rate of capital formation, which stops the economic development. Rate of capital formation is just 5%.

3- Backward Natural Resources

No doubt, developing countries including Pakistan have rich and many resources. But due to backward state of technology these resources are un-utilized, under-utilized or mis-utilized. So, the improper utilization of natural resources is also a hurdle in the development procedure. Share of natural resources to GDP is less than 1 %.

4- Backward State Technology

Use of backward technology is another problem of economic development.  Due to use of backward technology productivity level of our labour and its efficiency is very low. Productive quality and quantity is also inferior due to use of old means of production. Annual value of productivity of our labour is about $ 100 as compare to the more than $2500 in advanced countries.

5- Inflation

High rate of inflation is also a hurdle in way of economic development. Rate of inflation is 13.3 % in Pakistan. Due to inflation purchasing power of people decreases, their consumption increases and saving decreases. Low saving leads to less investment and a country remains poor and backward.

6- Low Per Capita Income

Per capita income of Pakistan is very low as compared to the rich nations. Low per capita income is due to low level of national income and high rate of population growth. Low per capita income results in low saving and low investment. So, in the economy, capital formation rate is low that is a serious obstacle in way of economic development. Per capita income in Pakistan is $ 1095.

7- Internal and External Debts

To operate some major projects, government has to take loans from national and international resources. These debts and their services charges are increasing day by day. While taking loans from abroad we have to follow the terms and conditions of foreign donors that is the obstacle in our growth and development process. Today, the burden of total public debts is Rs. 8160 billion and an external debt is $ 53.9 billion.

8- Dependence on Agriculture

In Pakistan, about 68% population is living in 46,894 villages. Their main occupation is agriculture that is at backward stage. Old methods of cultivation, less credit facilities, unorganized markets and limited irrigation facilities are factors, which are hurdle in the process of economic development. Total cropped area of Pakistan is 25.8 million hectares which is about 28% of total area.

9- Dualistic Economy

Dualistic economy refers to the huge difference between various economic sectors. There are vast regional and income disparities in Pakistan. There is co-existence of fully advanced and fully backward state of technology in the same sector at the same time. Similarly, population of Pakistan is very rich and very poor; it is also a hurdle in economic development.

10- Deficit Balance of Payment

Pakistan is facing the persistent deficit in its balance of payment since 1947 with the exception of 5 or 6 years. Higher imports volume than exports are an obstacle in way of economic development. At present, imports of Pakistan are $ 25.107 billion, exports are $ 14.162 billion and deficit in balance of payment is $ 10.945 billion in 2009-10.

These are the major social obstacles in way of economic development of Pakistan:

11- Illiteracy

Only 57 % population is literate in Pakistan. Due to illiteracy our farmer and industrialists are ignorant. Efficiency and productivity level of our labour is poor due to illiteracy. Use of modern techniques of production is impossible due to illiteracy. Accordingly, illiteracy is a difficulty in way of economic development.

12- Low of Living Standard

Low level of living is a hurdle in the way of economic development. Our population is backward and its growth rate is as high as 2.05 %. Poor population is not provided appropriate facilities to make high standard of life. Low level of living, low income, inadequate housing facilities, poor health etc. are the problems of economic development.

13- Joint Family and Caste system

Joint family system is also one of the main obstacles in the way of economic development. In joint family system all the members of the family do not work. They depend upon one another. Similarly, due to caste system rich and superior class do not work hard. 32.17 % population is working and 67.83 % is depending upon them in Pakistan.

14- Unproductive Expenditure

Most of the expenditure of people is unproductive like expenditure on various rural fairs and festivals. People in developing countries prefer to keep resources in cash form in lockers at home. They invest in real estates and in gold and silver ornaments. These resources can be used for economic development.

15- Consumption Oriented Society

Most of the population of Pakistan is consumption oriented. People have to make huge consumptions due to demonstration effect. Due to posh locality, friends and relatives people have to adjust their consumption styles. Consumption of people is very high due to fulfillment of customs, traditions and habits.

16- Rapidly Rising Population

In developing countries like Pakistan population growth rate is very high i. e., 2.05 %. The rapid backward population growth is also a hurdle in way of economic development. This rapidly increasing population leads to starvation and various social crimes.

Cultural obstacles are given below:

17- Customs and Traditions

In developing countries like Pakistan, people spend huge portion of their incomes on customs and traditions. Sometimes they have to take part in the arrangements of rural festivals that reduce their savings. People have to spend more on marriage, birth and death times in our country.

18- Wastage of Resources in Litigations

Legal process is very costly and lengthy in Pakistan. Especially, the large part of our farmer’s income is wasted in litigations. It is wastage of resources and reduction in the rate of saving.

19- Low Participation of Women

Almost 49 % population is female in Pakistan and out of them only 20 % takes an active part in economic activities. These facts are showing a little participation of women in economic activity that is also an obstacle in the way of economic development. Woman labour force is just 10.96 million.

20- Out-flow of the Best Brain

Brain drain is also a problem in way of economic development. In our country, honour, dignity, self-esteem and authorities of qualified person is very low. So, they are bound to go abroad to provide their services for other nations.

23- In-efficient Entrepreneur

Due to illiteracy and lack of training institution in our country entrepreneur is in-efficient. In-efficient entrepreneur is a cause of economic backwardness. Illiterate entrepreneur cannot maintain the proper record of his business to earn maximum profit.


These are political obstacles in the way of economic development:

23- Political Instability

There is political instability in Pakistan; the policies of the government are also instable. Due to political instability, rate of economic growth and development remains low in all the sectors of the economy. Investors feel hesitation while making investment if political situation is not stable.

25- Mis-use of Authorities

Mis-use of authorities and powers is a big problem in the way of economic development. Mis-use of authority leads to corruption and nepotism. Accordingly, there is no regard for talented, intelligent and brilliant brain.

25- Insincere Leaders

Politics in Pakistan creates insincere leaders. Political leaders have no interest with the welfare of population but their own interest. In Pakistan rich industrialists join politics to safeguard their industries. The Feudals involve in politics for the sake of status and power.

25- Changes in Fiscal Policy

In developing countries there are frequent changes in fiscal policy. Change in price level and tax rate is a common practice. It is also a hurdle in economic development.

Following administrative obstacles are problems in the way of economic development:

26- Corruption

In developing countries most of the officers are included in the curse of corruption. Sometimes, they have to make corruption due to any big administrative or political pressure.

27- Favouritism and Nepotism

Nepotism means selection according to relationship, not according to ability. In developing countries like Pakistan, there is favouritism and nepotism, which causes in economic backwardness. Preferences are given to the friends and relatives for the jobs.

28- Lengthy Legal Process

In developing countries law and order and legal process is very lengthy and costly. To obtain social justice, people have to waste their income and time. People have to depend upon the mood of the officer for their work in Pakistan. The official matters and domestic problems are highly inter-related.

29- Mis-use of Authorities

In our country, use of authorities is not reasonable. Officers use their powers for their personal interest. They give first preference to their own benefits and second preference to the public welfare.

30- Law and Order

Improper situation of law and order is also a problem in the way of economic development. Law and order conditions are not satisfactory in case of Pakistan. Here, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chohdery was demanding for justice and justice was not provided him for a long time.

AIOU Solved Assignment 1 Code 4671 Spring 2024

Q.3    What role population as a dynamic factor can play in economic development of any country?


Population problem lies at the heart of Pakistan’s social, economic and political problems. At the time of independence, Pakistan (united Pakistan that included former East Pakistan now Bangladesh) was the 13th most populous country in the world with a population of 32.5 million but in 1996 it was seventh with a population of 140 million. Today Pakistan is the 6th most populous country in the world with a population of 162 million. In 2050 its rank would be 5th far exceeding the Bangladesh whose rank in 2005 is 7 (Table 1). United States and Indonesia will retain their ranks. Pakistan’s population problem is distressing given its momentum and structure. Table 2 provides a bird’s eye view of the important demographic indicators comparing Pakistan’s population profile with the Asian countries. Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Asian countries is not agreeable and adequate. Pakistan has the highest birth as well as total fertility rate among the Asian countries. This is alarming and requires immediate and immense attention and action. Pakistan’s population has grown at an average rate of 3% per annum since 1951 until mid 1980s but it slowed to an average rate of 2.6% per annum during 1986-2000 and since 2001 it is growing at an average rate of almost 2% per annum. Had Pakistan’s population grown at 2% since 1960, Pakistan’s per capita income would have been Rs. 64366 as against Rs. 43748. During the five decades 1950- 2001, Pakistan’s population has increased 4.3 times, whereas the population of South Korea increased only 2.4 times. Over the same period per capita income in Pakistan increased by only five times from $79 in 1950 to $503 in 2001, whereas in South Korea it increased by 129 times from $82 in 1950 to $10550 in 2001 . Pakistan’s population growth rate is now highest in Asia at 2.8%. In 1947, a million people were added every year or so but today we are adding a million every three months. No conceivable development plan can sustain such a rate of population growth . This evidence makes obvious the nature and severity of population problem. Since 1960s different governments have made serious efforts to check the unbridled population growth but the efforts have not succeeded. Because the common man has developed a phobia of practicing birth control mainly due to social reasons and cultural factors . In absolute numbers almost 128 millions persons have been added during the last 58 years (1951-2008). The population density has increased four times from 42.5 persons per square kilometer in 1951 to 203 persons per square kilometer today. Rural-urban migration has swelled over the years due to push and pull factors and the urban population has increased from 6 million in 1951 to 57 million in 2008. This situation has exerted an enormous pressure on the supply of infrastructure like housing, transportation, electricity, water, sewerage, health and educational faculties . Furthermore: a) Sex ratio has declined over the years. It declined from 115 in 1972 to 111 in 1981 and to 107 in 1995 implying that the frequency of females has followed an increasing trend. This is distressing and painful

and is expected to fall further that will intensify social, psychological and economic problems for parents as well as females. There seems no solution to this agonizing problem in the short-run. Polygamy will make the confusion worse confounded. It is extremely difficult to adopt the western social system and values. Improvement in operation and implementation of the family planning program, increase in female literacy rate and enhancement of women social status appear to be an agreeable solution. b) Rapid population growth in Pakistan has been alarming. Pakistan though ranked 6th in size adds more than twice as many peoples to the absolute growth of world population than USA which ranks third. This situation has created insurmountable and complicated social, economic and political problems that have negative impact on the macroeconomic stability of the economy. Ethnic-strife and deteriorating law and order situation, heartbreaking problems of housing, expensive educational and health facilities, traffic density and congestion, frequent and fatal accidents have made the common man life miserable and unsustainable. These problems will aggravate if the population momentum continues. c) These factors have collectively contributed to escalating cost of living that breeds macroeconomic instability on one hand and on the other hand, rising  absolute and relative poverty and worsening income inequalities are the direct as well as indirect result of the aforesaid factors. Thus rapid population growth is the bone of contention as well as crux of the problems. Socio-economic conditions would be better off if population were to grow slowly that would have also resulted in a better social and economic condition. d) Agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan’s economy. The arable land and almost all crops in Pakistan rely on irrigation. Supplies of both arable land and fresh water are unlikely to increase, calling into question Pakistan’s ability to feed itself. Population pressures are threatening arable land, forests and water resources. The size of arable land holdings has decreased due to population growth, inadequate arable land reforms and inheritance patterns. Before the middle of this century, Pakistan is projected to face a scarcity of arable land with even less arable land available per person than in China. Limited renewable fresh water supplies may be the biggest obstacle to increasing Pakistan’s food supply .

AIOU Solved Assignment 2 Code 4671 Spring 2024

Q.4    Is the concept of dualism adequately portrays the development picture in most of under developed countries? Discuss

Ans. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil – or God and the Devil – are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical – or mind and body or mind and brain – are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world.

The mind-body problem is the problem: what is the relationship between mind and body? Or alternatively: what is the relationship between mental properties and physical properties?

Humans have (or seem to have) both physical properties and mental properties. People have (or seem to have)the sort of properties attributed in the physical sciences. These physical properties include size, weight, shape, colour, motion through space and time, etc. But they also have (or seem to have) mental properties, which we do not attribute to typical physical objects These properties involve consciousness (including perceptual experience, emotional experience, and much else), intentionality (including beliefs, desires, and much else), and they are possessed by a subject or a self.

Physical properties are public, in the sense that they are, in principle, equally observable by anyone. Some physical properties – like those of an electron – are not directly observable at all, but they are equally available to all, to the same degree, with scientific equipment and techniques. The same is not true of mental properties. I may be able to tell that you are in pain by your behaviour, but only you can feel it directly. Similarly, you just know how something looks to you, and I can only surmise. Conscious mental events are private to the subject, who has a privileged access to them of a kind no-one has to the physical.

The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between these two sets of properties. The mind-body problem breaks down into a number of components.

The ontological question: what are mental states and what are physical states? Is one class a subclass of the other, so that all mental states are physical, or vice versa? Or are mental states and physical states entirely distinct?

The causal question: do physical states influence mental states? Do mental states influence physical states? If so, how?

Different aspects of the mind-body problem arise for different aspects of the mental, such as consciousness, intentionality, the self.

The problem of consciousness: what is consciousness? How is it related to the brain and the body?

The problem of intentionality: what is intentionality? How is it related to the brain and the body?

The problem of the self: what is the self? How is it related to the brain and the body?

Other aspects of the mind-body problem arise for aspects of the physical. For example:

The problem of embodiment: what is it for the mind to be housed in a body? What is it for a body to belong to a particular subject?

The seemingly intractable nature of these problems have given rise to many different philosophical views.

Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states. Behaviourism, functionalism, mind-brain identity theory and the computational theory of mind are examples of how materialists attempt to explain how this can be so. The most common factor in such theories is the attempt to explicate the nature of mind and consciousness in terms of their ability to directly or indirectly modify behaviour, but there are versions of materialism that try to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role. The latter are often grouped together under the label ‘non-reductive physicalism’, though this label is itself rendered elusive because of the controversial nature of the term ‘reduction’.

Idealist views say that physical states are really mental. This is because the physical world is an empirical world and, as such, it is the intersubjective product of our collective experience.

Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other. For the various forms that dualism can take and the associated problems, see below.

In sum, we can say that there is a mind-body problem because both consciousness and thought, broadly construed, seem very different from anything physical and there is no convincing consensus on how to build a satisfactorily unified picture of creatures possessed of both a mind and a body.

Other entries which concern aspects of the mind-body problem include (among many others): behaviorism, consciousness, eliminative materialism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, identity theory, intentionality, mental causation, neutral monism, and physicalism.

In dualism, ‘mind’ is contrasted with ‘body’, but at different times, different aspects of the mind have been the centre of attention. In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.

The classical emphasis originates in Plato’s Phaedo. Plato believed that the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of which bodies are imperfect copies. These Forms not only make the world possible, they also make it intelligible, because they perform the role of universals, or what Frege called ‘concepts’. It is their connection with intelligibility that is relevant to the philosophy of mind. Because Forms are the grounds of intelligibility, they are what the intellect must grasp in the process of understanding. In Phaedo Plato presents a variety of arguments for the immortality of the soul, but the one that is relevant for our purposes is that the intellect is immaterial because Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends (78b4–84b8). This affinity is so strong that the soul strives to leave the body in which it is imprisoned and to dwell in the realm of Forms. It may take many reincarnations before this is achieved. Plato’s dualism is not, therefore, simply a doctrine in the philosophy of mind, but an integral part of his whole metaphysics.

One problem with Plato’s dualism was that, though he speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body, there is no clear account of what binds a particular soul to a particular body. Their difference in nature makes the union a mystery.

Aristotle did not believe in Platonic Forms, existing independently of their instances. Aristotelian forms (the capital ‘F’ has disappeared with their standing as autonomous entities) are the natures and properties of things and exist embodied in those things. This enabled Aristotle to explain the union of body and soul by saying that the soul is the form of the body. This means that a particular person’s soul is no more than his nature as a human being. Because this seems to make the soul into a property of the body, it led many interpreters, both ancient and modern, to interpret his theory as materialistic. The interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind – and, indeed, of his whole doctrine of form – remains as live an issue today as it was immediately after his death (Robinson 1983 and 1991; Nussbaum 1984; Rorty and Nussbaum, eds, 1992). Nevertheless, the text makes it clear that Aristotle believed that the intellect, though part of the soul, differs from other faculties in not having a bodily organ. His argument for this constitutes a more tightly argued case than Plato’s for the immateriality of thought and, hence, for a kind of dualism. He argued that the intellect must be immaterial because if it were material it could not receive all forms. Just as the eye, because of its particular physical nature, is sensitive to light but not to sound, and the ear to sound and not to light, so, if the intellect were in a physical organ it could be sensitive only to a restricted range of physical things; but this is not the case, for we can think about any kind of material object (De Anima III,4; 429a10–b9). As it does not have a material organ, its activity must be essentially immaterial.

It is common for modern Aristotelians, who otherwise have a high view of Aristotle’s relevance to modern philosophy, to treat this argument as being of purely historical interest, and not essential to Aristotle’s system as a whole. They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance. Kenny (1989) argues that Aristotle’s theory of mind as form gives him an account similar to Ryle (1949), for it makes the soul equivalent to the dispositions possessed by a living body. This ‘anti-Cartesian’ approach to Aristotle arguably ignores the fact that, for Aristotle, the form is the substance.

These issues might seem to be of purely historical interest. But we shall see in below, in section 4.5, that this is not so.

The identification of form and substance is a feature of Aristotle’s system that Aquinas effectively exploits in this context, identifying soul, intellect and form, and treating them as a substance. (See, for example, Aquinas (1912), Part I, questions 75 and 76.) But though the form (and, hence, the intellect with which it is identical) are the substance of the human person, they are not the person itself. Aquinas says that when one addresses prayers to a saint – other than the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is believed to retain her body in heaven and is, therefore, always a complete person – one should say, not, for example, ‘Saint Peter pray for us’, but ‘soul of Saint Peter pray for us’. The soul, though an immaterial substance, is the person only when united with its body. Without the body, those aspects of its personal memory that depend on images (which are held to be corporeal) will be lost.(See Aquinas (1912), Part I, question 89.)

The more modern versions of dualism have their origin in Descartes’ Meditations, and in the debate that was consequent upon Descartes’ theory. Descartes was a substance dualist. He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks. Descartes’ conception of the relation between mind and body was quite different from that held in the Aristotelian tradition. For Aristotle, there is no exact science of matter. How matter behaves is essentially affected by the form that is in it. You cannot combine just any matter with any form – you cannot make a knife out of butter, nor a human being out of paper – so the nature of the matter is a necessary condition for the nature of the substance. But the nature of the substance does not follow from the nature of its matter alone: there is no ‘bottom up’ account of substances. Matter is a determinable made determinate by form. This was how Aristotle thought that he was able to explain the connection of soul to body: a particular soul exists as the organizing principle in a particular parcel of matter.

The belief in the relative indeterminacy of matter is one reason for Aristotle’s rejection of atomism. If matter is atomic, then it is already a collection of determinate objects in its own right, and it becomes natural to regard the properties of macroscopic substances as mere summations of the natures of the atoms.

Although, unlike most of his fashionable contemporaries and immediate successors, Descartes was not an atomist, he was, like the others, a mechanist about the properties of matter. Bodies are machines that work according to their own laws. Except where there are minds interfering with it, matter proceeds deterministically, in its own right. Where there are minds requiring to influence bodies, they must work by ‘pulling levers’ in a piece of machinery that already has its own laws of operation. This raises the question of where those ‘levers’ are in the body. Descartes opted for the pineal gland, mainly because it is not duplicated on both sides of the brain, so it is a candidate for having a unique, unifying function.

The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.

Various of Descartes’ disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.

Descartes’ conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all. Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks, he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas’ that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.

In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas – that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.

One should note the following about Hume’s theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.

A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument – all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond. It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism. But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.

AIOU Solved Assignment Code 4671 Autumn 2024

Q.5    Discuss the basic reasons for initial rapid economic growth amongst the new developed countries, but the same he not happened to the under developed countries.


A developed economy is typically characteristic of a developed country with a relatively high level of economic growth and security. Standard criteria for evaluating a country’s level of development are income per capita or per capita gross domestic product, the level of industrialization, the general standard of living, and the amount of technological infrastructure.

Noneconomic factors, such as the human development index (HDI), which quantifies a country’s levels of education, literacy, and health into a single figure, can also be used to evaluate an economy or the degree of development.


The most common metric used to determine if an economy is developed or developing is per capita gross domestic product (GDP), although no strict level exists for an economy to be considered either developing or developed. Some economists consider $12,000 to $15,000 per capita GDP to be sufficient for developed status while others do not consider a country developed unless its per capita GDP is above $25,000 or $30,000. The U.S. per capita GDP in 2019 was $65,111.

For countries that are difficult to categorize, economists turn to other factors to determine development status. Standard-of-living measures, such as the infant mortality rate and life expectancy, are useful although there are no set boundaries for these measures either. However, most developed economies suffer fewer than 10 infant deaths per 1,000 live births, and their citizens live to be 75 or older on average.

A high per capita GDP alone does not confer developed economy status without other factors. For example, the United Nations still considers Qatar, with one of the world’s highest per capita GDP in 2019 at $69,688, a developing economy because the nation has extreme income inequality, a lack of infrastructure, and limited educational opportunities for non-affluent citizens.

Examples of countries with developed economies include the United States, Canada, and most of western Europe, including the United Kingdom and France.

The Human Development Index

The HDI looks at three standards of living criteria—literacy rates, access to education, and access to health care—and quantifies this data into a standardized figure between 0 and 1. Most developed countries have HDI figures above 0.8.

The United Nations, in its annual HDI rankings, reports that in 2019, Norway had the world’s highest HDI at 0.954. The United States ranked 15th at 0.920. The top 10 countries in the HDI index were Norway, Switzerland, Ireland, Germany, Hong Kong (China), Australia, Iceland, Sweden, Singapore, and the Netherlands. Niger had the lowest human development index score at 0.377 out of 189 countries.

Developing Economies

Terms such as “emerging countries,” “least-developed countries,” and “developing countries” are commonly used to refer to countries that do not enjoy the same level of economic security, industrialization, and growth as developed countries. The term “third-world country” to describe a state is today considered archaic and offensive.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development notes that the world’s least-developed countries are “deemed highly disadvantaged in their development process—many of them for geographical reasons—and (face) more than other countries the risk of failing to come out of poverty.”

It is often claimed by proponents of globalization, that globalization is helping to lift developing economies out of poverty and onto a path of improved standards of living, higher wages, and use of modern technology. These benefits have primarily been witnessed in the Asia-Pacific region. Though globalization has not taken root in all developing economies, it has shown to improve the economies in the ones that it has. That being said, globalization does come with drawbacks as well that need to be assessed when foreign investments flow into a developing economy.

There are many examples of countries that have converged with developed countries which validate the catch-up theory. Based on case studies on Japan, Mexico and other countries, Nakaoka studied social capabilities for industrialization and clarified features of human and social attitudes in the catching-up process of Japan in the Meiji period (1868-1912). In the 1960s and 1970s the East Asian Tigers rapidly converged with developed economies. These include Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan – all of which are today considered developed economies. In the post-war period (1945–1960) examples include West Germany, France and Japan, which were able to quickly regain their prewar status by replacing capital that was lost during World War II.

Some economists criticise the theory, stating that endogenous factors, such as government policy, are much more influential in economic growth than exogenous factors. For example, Alexander Gerschenkron states that governments can substitute for missing prerequisites to trigger catch-up growth. A hypothesis by economic historians Kenneth Sokoloff and Stanley Engerman suggested that factor endowments are a central determinant of structural inequality that impedes institutional development in some countries. Sokoloff and Engerman proposed that in the 19th century, countries such as Brazil and Cuba with rich factor endowments such as soil and climate are predisposed to a guarded franchise with limited institutional growth. Land that is suitable for sugar and coffee such as Cuba experienced economies of scale from the establishment of plantation that in turn created the small elite families with vested interest in guarded franchise. The exogenous suitability of land for wheat versus sugar determines the growth rate for many countries. Therefore, countries with land that is suitable for sugar converge with other countries that also have land that is suitable for growing sugar.

Sokoloff and Engerman explained this convergence in their article “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.” They explained that the United States and Canada started out as two of the poorest colonies in the New World but grew faster than other countries as a result of their soil qualities. They argued that the United States and Canada had land suitable for growing wheat which meant that they had small scale farming, since wheat does not benefit from economies of scale, and this led to a relatively equal distribution of wealth and political power enabling the population to vote for broad public education. This differentiated them from countries such as Cuba that had land suitable for growing sugar and coffee. Such countries did benefit from economies of scale and so had large plantation agriculture with slave labor, large income and class inequalities, and limited voting rights. This difference in political power led to little spending on the establishment of institutions such as public schools and slowed down their progress. As a result, countries with relative equality and access to public education grew faster and were able to converge on countries with inequality and limited education.



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